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Forensic
Fail?

as research continues to underscore the
fallibility of forensic science, the judge’s role
as gatekeeper is more important than ever.

VOLUME 102

NUMBER 1

SPRING 2018

JUDICATURE

Published by the Bolch Judicial Institute at Duke Law. Reprinted
with permission. © 2018 Duke University School of Law.
All rights reserved. judicialstudies.duke.edu/judicature

4

16					

				

Introduction
BY BRANDON L. GARRETT

THIS YEAR MARKS THE 25TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT’S
DECISION IN DAUBERT V. MERRELL DOW
PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., which fundamentally reshaped how judges evaluate
scientific and expert evidence.1 This volume
of Judicature, with three wonderful contributions by Jay Koehler, Pate Skene, and
an expert team led by William Thompson,
comes at an ideal time to reconsider how
successful the modern judicial approach to
expert evidence has been. That approach is
now reflected in Federal Rule of Evidence
702, revised in 2000 to comport with
the Daubert ruling, and in state judicial rulings and state rules of evidence,
which have followed suit in most states.2
The Supreme Court’s Daubert ruling
coincided with a surge in scientific
research relevant to criminal cases,
including the development of modern
DNA testing that both exonerated
hundreds of individuals and provided
more accurate evidence of guilt. Since
then, leading scientific commissions
have pointed out real shortcomings in
the use of forensic evidence in the courtroom. They also have noted that judges
have largely abdicated their responsibility as gatekeepers.3 Moreover, we have
learned that those same DNA exonerations are not a one-sided triumph of
modern forensic science, because over
half of those innocent people were originally convicted by flawed, overstated,
and unreliable forensics.4 A flood of scandals have led to audits of thousands of
state and federal cases, lab closures, and
review commissions. In response to
such concerns, the Judicial Conference
Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules
has solicited comments on potential
revisions to Rule 702 addressing forensic expert testimony.5
In this volume, William Thompson
and his coauthors describe how we are
undergoing a sea change in forensics,
particularly in the pattern disciplines.
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This is a time of crisis but also a time
of great promise in forensic science. The
terminology used to express conclusions,
error-rate statistics, and the fundamental conception of what experts are
doing are all in flux. Traditional disciplines like latent fingerprinting, which
has been done the same way for over a
hundred years, are on the cusp of a transformation. In that field, analysts would
typically state without qualification
that a print was a “match” and came
from the defendant, and that there was
a zero probability of an error. Now it is
well understood that no human expertise is immune from error, any subjective
comparison is inherently probabilistic,
and expertise depends on the proficiency
of the person doing the analysis.
Today, as Thompson and colleagues
describe, forensic expert conclusions are
becoming more appropriately cautious
in many disciplines. The 2016 White
House Presidential Council of Advisers
on Science and Technology (PCAST)
report emphasized the need to validate
forensics, including by studying error
rates and informing jurors of those error
rates.6 The 2017 American Association
for the Advancement of Science (AAAS
report), which Thompson co-authored,
recommended such changes as well and
made more detailed recommendations
concerning the language to be used in
latent fingerprinting.7 Indeed, forensic
conclusions may soon be quantitative;
Thompson describes the move to incorporate statistics in forensics. Researchers
are hard at work on methods to use algorithms to supplement or even supplant
the subjective judgment of individual
forensic analysts.
Next, Jay Koehler focuses on reliability: What are the error rates for forensics?
As Koehler notes, many people assume
that forensics are nearly infallible. If
jurors think that forensic experts are
infallible but judges know they are not,
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then what is the obligation of a judge to
ensure that the jury is informed about
the limitations of the science?
Rule 702 states that an expert may
testify if using “reliable principles and
methods,” which are “reliably applied” to
the facts.8 Or as the Advisory Committee
states, judges shall “exclude unreliable
expert testimony.”9 Koehler is right that
now is the time to ask whether the “reliability rule” adopted in Daubert and in
Rule 702 is being appropriately used by
the judiciary.
Koehler also highlights the (sometimes quite aggressive) responses to
the PCAST report. Some members of
government agencies and professional
organizations called the report unfounded
and biased for suggesting that a range of
forensic disciplines lack empirically validated reliability. They suggest there is
no problem with continuing to rely on
an expert’s experience and subjective
professional judgment.
In response, Koehler emphasizes
judges should not admit evidence just
because an expert claims to have experience. Judges should not admit evidence
just because other judges have done
so for a long time. Judges should not
admit evidence just because experts take
(extremely unrealistic and easy) proficiency tests. Experts should have to show
that their work is reliable and that they
are truly proficient. That is, after all,
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what Rule 702 demands. The problem,
Koehler concludes, is not with the text
of the rule, but its laissez-faire application by judges.
Finally, Pate Skene further explores
what the proper role of judges is at a
time when empirical evidence to support
so many forensics can be mixed or lacking. Skene describes how judges have
themselves raised real questions about
the reliability of commonly used forensic
techniques. Skene focuses on the problem that for many forensic techniques,
well-designed empirical studies have not
yet been conducted to validate the reliability of the techniques. The PCAST
report emphasized as much.
Turning back to jurors, Skene highlights how important it is for judges not
to just exercise their role as gatekeeper,
but also to ensure that when forensic
evidence is admitted, jurors hear about
its limitations. Jurors are highly receptive to information about error rates
in forensic techniques and information about the proficiency of particular
forensic analysts, as Greg Mitchell and
I have shown in several studies.10 Skene
suggests that such information may be
conveyed by jury instructions or by additional experts who can explain error rates
or reliability concerns to the jury. Skene
also suggests that the need for judicial
intervention to educate jurors will be
greatest when there is less known about
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the reliability of a forensic technique.
Twenty-five years after Daubert, the
reliability revolution is still nascent. In
an era of plea bargaining and the vanishing criminal trial, it is all the more
important that judges safeguard reliability, since it will be the rare occasion when
a fact-finder can scrutinize reliability in
the courtroom. It is equally important
that crime labs themselves incorporate
blind proficiency and error management as part of routine quality control.
In response to quite complex problems,
these thought-provoking contributions
from Koehler, Thompson, and Skene set
out a clear agenda to bring reliability
back into our criminal courtrooms.
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